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ABSTRACT 
This paper is based on an analysis of the results of more than 40 public opinion surveys taken 
during the period from 1989 through 2002; special attention is given to surveys taken during 
2000-02. The analysis concludes that approximately two-fifths of the public are seriously 
concerned about global warming. Another two-fifths are moderately concerned; shifts in the 
opinions of this moderately concerned group would likely alter the future course of 
government policies. The other one-fifth of the public does not consider global warming 
much of a problem, does not worry about it very much or not at all, and does not believe that 
carbon dioxide emissions are a cause of it. A substantial majority of the US public wants the 
government to do something about the problem of global warming, and they would like the 
US to participate in the Kyoto Protocol. Most respondents prefer mandatory rather than 
voluntary emission reductions by industry. A majority of the public supports US economic 
assistance to fund mitigation projects in developing countries. Gaps between the US public 
and US leaders are evident, with the public exhibiting more concern and more support for 
new policies. The level of US public concern is nearly as high as it is among European 
publics, where there is also opposition to current US policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper identifies key patterns and trends in US public opinion on climate change issues 
during the period 1989-2002; it focuses on the following questions: 
•  What patterns and trends in levels of awareness, understanding and concern about climate 
change issues are evident? 
•  What is the public’s assessment of the Kyoto Protocol and the US administration’s 
decision not to participate in it? 
•  What government policy alternatives are favoured or opposed? 
•  What variability is there across different segments of the public in their concerns and 
opinions?  
•  What are the similarities and differences between US public opinion and US leaders’ 
opinions?  
•  What are the similarities and differences between the opinions of the US and European 
publics? 
Answers to those questions are based on an examination of more than 40 polls conducted by 
major survey organisations during the period 1989-2002.
1 In addition to US surveys, there 
were two international surveys that make possible cross-national comparisons of US and 
European opinions. The sample sizes are typically about 1000 thus have sampling errors of 
+/- 3% at the 95% confidence level. The tables, footnotes, references section and the body of 
the paper provide additional information about sample sizes, time periods and other features 
of the surveys. Also see the Appendix for a complete list of surveys arranged by year and 
survey organisation or sponsoring organisation. 
As one would expect, the surveys have been somewhat concentrated by sub-periods. The first 
was 1989-92. An unusually hot summer and Congressional hearings in 1988 brought global 
warming to public attention, as did the Rio summit in 1992, which produced the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The second was 1997-98, when the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed and debated. The third was 2000-02, when the issue entered the 
presidential election of 2000, and then in 2001-02 as the new US administration withdrew 
from the Kyoto Protocol process. 
                                                 
1 Given the focus of this paper on the specific questions noted at the outset, the paper does not report all of the 
results of all of the questions. Because the paper is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of 
opinions concerning climate change issues, it uses only the available data that are directly related to the 
questions posed. Of course, there are many other questions that could be addressed and additional data relevant 
to them that could be reported. In short, there is much data available to address other questions – for instance, 
questions about the effects on opinions of press reports, extreme weather events, and the results of scientific 
studies.  T HOMAS L. BREWER 
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All survey data have limitations, of course. Their results often depend on nuances in the 
wording of questions, for instance, and they sometimes reflect only transient movements in 
volatile opinions that are reacting to immediate circumstances. It is also often difficult to 
predict behaviour, such as voting behaviour or consumer behaviour, on the basis of the stated 
preferences recorded in surveys. Yet, survey data can be used to discern patterns and trends 
over time, analyse the correlates of opinions, and assess their implications for government 
policies and business decisions. These opportunities are available, in particular, when there 
are surveys with the same questions repeated over time and also surveys by different 
organisations using different questions to tap opinions on related issues during the same time 
periods. 
Because the analysis of the paper is based partly on recurrent surveys with repeated questions 
about many aspects of climate change issues over more than a decade, as well as questions 
with different wordings from different polling organisations about the same issue, it is 
possible to discern key patterns and trends with a high degree of confidence. This is 
particularly true for the period since 1997, when there have been several surveys with many 
questions about climate change issues. 
2.  Levels of Awareness, Understanding and Concern 
A review of the results of eight separate surveys sponsored by seven different organisations 
during 1997-2001 found that “only a very small minority - less than a quarter of the public – 
doubts the reality of global warming” (Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2002). In 
2001, nearly two-thirds of the public agreed when asked “Are the emissions of gases like CO2 
causing global temperature increases?” (Gallup, 2002a); approximately one-half of the 
Republicans and three-fourths of the Democrats responded “yes” to the question (CNN, 
2001). The proportion of the public that recognises that most scientists believe that global 
warming is occurring was 61% in 2001, up from 48% in 1997 (Gallup, 2001a). People’s self-
perception of the level of their understanding of the problem has also increased – from the 
53% in 1992 who thought they understood it “fairly well” or “very well” to 69% in 2001 and 
69% again in 2002 (Gallup, 2001a; 2002b). 
In 2001 and 2002, 54 and 53%, respectively, reported that they thought the “effects” of global 
warming had “already begun” – up slightly from 48% in 1997 (Gallup, 2002b; 2002c). 
Similarly, in response to the question, “Do you think global warming will pose a serious 
threat to you or your way of life in your lifetime?,” 31% said “yes” in 2001 and 33% in 2002 
– an increase from 25% in 1997 (Gallup, 2002c). 
According to a Harris/Yankelovich poll in 2001, 43% said global warming was a “very 
serious problem” (Time, 2001). A Zogby survey of likely voters in 2002 asked “Do you 
believe that global warming is a serious problem today, is not yet a serious problem but will 
be in the future, or is not a problem at all?” In response, 41% said that global warming is a 
serious problem now (Reuters, 2002). 
According to a standard Gallup Poll question concerning people’s worries, about one-third of 
the public has been worried about global warming “a great deal”, and slightly less than a third 
have been worried about it “a fair amount” (Gallup, 2002b). In a Gallup survey in March 
2001, 33% reported worrying “a great deal” about global warming (Gallup, 2001a).
2 The time 
                                                 
2 This survey was taken two weeks before the Harris/Yankelovich poll noted above – in which 43% said global 
warming was a “very serious problem”. This 10-point difference probably reflects a difference in the wording of 
the response categories (“worry a great deal” versus “very serious problem”) and/or possibly the context of the 
question in the interview.   WHERE IS THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE IN PUBLIC OPINION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES? 
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series data indicate that the level of US public worry about global warming was the lowest in 
1997 – perhaps reflecting a belief that the Kyoto Protocol, which was receiving much 
attention at the time, would ameliorate the problem. More recently, in 2000, 72% of the public 
reported that they were worried “a great deal” or a “fair amount” – perhaps in response to the 
IPCC’s Third Assessment and associated news reports at that time. There was subsequently a 
slight decline in concern, with 65% in 2001 and 58% in 2002 reporting that they were worried 
“a great deal” or a “fair amount” (see Table 1).
3 
Table 1. Trend data for level of worry about global warming 
Question: “How much do you personally worry about … the greenhouse effect or global 
warming?” 
Month/Year
 
 5/89 4/90 4/91   10/97 3/98 4/99 4/00 3/01 3/02 
“Great  deal” 35% 30%  35%  …..  24% 28%  34%  40%  33%  29% 
“Fair  amount”  28  27 27 …..  26  31 34  32  30  29 
“Only a little”  18  20  22  …..  29  23  18  15  22  23 
“Not at all”  12  16  12  …..  17  16  12  12  13  17 
Source: Gallup (2002a). 
 
The level of public concern about global warming can be further understood in the context of 
concerns about other environmental problems. Concerns about water pollution were at the top 
of the environmental worry lists in 2001 and 2002, when 82-88% reported worrying about 
pollution of drinking water and pollution of rivers, lakes and reservoirs. Nearly as high were 
concerns about air pollution, with 82% reporting in 2002 that they worried “a great deal” or “a 
fair amount” about it (Gallup, 2002b). 
The extent to which greenhouse emissions may be included in the respondents’ notion of air 
pollution is not known. However, there is data about the specific air pollution problems of 
global warming and ozone depletion. In each of seven polls between 1989 and 2001, between 
6 and 13% more of the respondents worried “a great deal” or “a fair amount” about ozone 
depletion than global warming. But it has been observed that “as global warming is a function 
of other environmental problems – air pollution, deforestation, and damage to the ozone layer 
– the public’s knowledge about and awareness of these may contribute, more than the figures 
[about levels of worry] would suggest, to greater public support for efforts to curb global 
warming” (Gallup, 2001b). 
3.  The Kyoto Protocol 
A survey sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall 
Fund of the United States in the summer of 2002 asked two questions about the Kyoto 
                                                 
3 The challenges of encapsulating such data into highlights, headlines or sound bites were evident in two reports 
in early 2001, where headlines created rather different impressions about the state of US public opinion at the 
time. One in January carried the title and headline, “Scientists Deliver Serious Warning About Effects of Global 
Warming: 4 in 10 Americans worry ‘a great deal’ about this environmental problem” (Gallup, 2001b). Another 
in April reported that “Americans Consider Global Warming Real, but Not Alarming: Only 31% feel it poses 
serious risk in their lifetime” (Gallup, 2001a).  T HOMAS L. BREWER 
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Protocol (CCFR/GMF, 2002a).
4 First: “Based on what you know, do you think the U.S. 
should or should not participate in the following treaties and agreements? … The Kyoto 
Protocol to reduce global warming….” Nearly two-thirds (64%) said the US should 
participate, while 21% said the US should not participate. The remaining 15% did not know 
or offered other opinions (CCFR, 2002b, p. 3). A separate sub-sample was asked a related by 
differently worded question after an information preface:  
An international treaty calls on the U.S. and other industrialised nations to cut 
back on their emissions from power plants and cars in order to reduce global 
warming, also known as the greenhouse effect. Some people say this would hurt 
the U.S. economy and is based on uncertain science. Others say this is needed to 
protect the environment and could create new business opportunities. What’s your 
view – do you think the United States should or should not join this treaty 
requiring less emissions from U.S. power plants and cars? 
Slightly over two-thirds (70%) replied that the US should join, while 25% thought the US 
should not join. The remaining 5% of the respondents were not sure or offered other replies 
(CCFR/GMF, 2002b, p. 5). 
By comparison, in two separate polls in April and July of 2001 by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates, about one-half of the public indicated that it disapproved of the US 
administration’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol; the percentages were respectively 47 and 51 
in the polls.
5 The wording of the question was as follows: “As you may know, George W. 
Bush has decided that the US should withdraw its support from the global warming agreement 
adopted in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. Do you approve or disapprove of this decision?” Since both 
of these polls were thus asking about people’s opinions about an action by a recently elected 
administration, there may have been a tendency to respond partly in terms of more generalised 
support or opposition to the administration, particularly in light of the close and contested 
election outcome. In any case, the same surveys found 25 and 32% indicating approval of the 
rejection of the Protocol; the 25% indicating approval of the administration’s rejection of the 
Protocol corresponds to the same proportion indicating that the US should not join, as found 
in the survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of 
the United States.
6 See Table 2 for comparisons of the data from these surveys. 
In sum, in response to an independent stand-alone policy question, about two-thirds of the US 
public would like the United States to participate in the Kyoto Protocol, while only about one-
fourth is opposed. However, the former proportion is about one-half if the question is posed in 
terms of opposition or support for the current administration’s rejection of the Protocol. The 
proportion supporting participation in the Protocol was greater in every poll than the 
proportion opposing it - no matter how asked – with the difference averaging 32 percentage 
points. 
                                                 
4 These questions were asked of sub-samples of the total sample of 3262 in order to avoid reactive effects in the 
responses to multiple questions about the same issue. The sub-sample size for the first question was 1113, with a 
+/- 3% confidence interval at the 95% level. A separate sub-sample for the second question was 700, with a +/- 
4% confidence interval at the 95% level. 
5 The 2001 Princeton Survey Research Associates/Pew Research Center data are reported at www.gallup.com, 
retrieved on 19 April 2002. 
6 The wording and logic of the question may have caused confusion for some respondents since the question was 
phrased in terms of approving or disapproving of the administration’s rejection of the Protocol – in contrast to 
approving or disapproving of the Protocol; this phrasing could therefore also account for differences in the 
Princeton SRA and CCFR/GMF results. In addition, the Princeton SRA data are based on half samples of 
approximately 500 respondents and thus have sampling errors of +/- 5% at the 95% confidence level.   WHERE IS THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE IN PUBLIC OPINION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES? 
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Table 2. Comparisons of results of CCFR/GMF and Princeton SRA surveys of opinions on 
Kyoto Protocol 
 CCFR/GMF  Princeton  SRA 
Date  (month/year)  6/02 6/02 4/01 7/01 
Question (see notes below) 
a b c 
c 
      
Support US participation/Disapprove US rejection  64%  70%  47%  51% 
Oppose US participation/Approve US rejection  21%  25%  25%  32% 
Difference
d  +43%     +45%  +22%   +19% 
a “Based on what you know, do you think the U.S. should or should not participate in the following treaties and 
agreements? … The Kyoto Protocol to reduce global warming….” 
b “An international treaty calls on the U.S. and other industrialised nations to cut back on their emissions from 
power plants and cars in order to reduce global warming, also known as the greenhouse effect. Some people say 
this would hurt the U.S. economy and is based on uncertain science. Others say this is needed to protect the 
environment and could create new business opportunities. What’s your view – do you think the United States 
should or should not join this treaty requiring less emissions from U.S. power plants and cars?” 
c “As you may know, George W. Bush has decided that the U.S. should withdraw its support from the global 
warming agreement adopted in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. Do you approve or disapprove of this decision?” 
… 
d Differences between support-oppose and disapprove-approve computed by the author.
 
Sources: CCFR/GMF (CCFR, 2002b); and for the Princeton SRA polls, Gallup (2002c).  
 
Correlates.  A Harris Poll in August 2001 found that education levels were related to 
awareness and policy positions. Among those with high school or less education, half had 
“seen, heard or read of recent international agreements in Kyoto and Bonn to limit emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to reduce global warming”; a higher proportion 
of those with college degrees than those with less education reported that they had been aware 
of these reports. There were also differences across parties; among those who said they were 
aware of the agreements, 54% of the self-identified Republicans approved of them, compared 
with 74% of the Independents, and 86% of the Democrats (Harris, 2001). 
4.  Mandatory vs. Voluntary Emissions Reductions 
In a Gallup survey in March 2001, a month after the administration announced it would not 
support mandatory domestic restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions, 48% disapproved of the 
decision and 41% approved (Gallup, 2002d). Thus, as with the Kyoto Protocol decision, more 
opposed than favored the administration’s position. 
In a July 2002 poll, 76% of the respondents preferred that the “government set standards that 
require industries to reduce” greenhouse gas emissions; 16% preferred a “voluntary approach 
to global warming” (Reuters, 2002; Union of Concerned Scientists, 2002a; 2002b). In the 
same survey, 21% agreed with the statement that “President Bush’s voluntary approach to 
reducing global warming pollution is enough,” and that “Americans will simply adapt to the 
inevitable changes.” A majority of the Republicans (58 to 67%, depending on the precise 
question) who were interviewed in July 2002, preferred mandatory reductions, while 23 to 
33% preferred a voluntary approach and supported the administration’s policy (Reuters, 2002; 
Union of Concerned Scientists, 2002). The self-identified Republicans and the respondents  T HOMAS L. BREWER 
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who voted for Mr. Bush in the 2000 election conformed to the overall majority support for 
mandatory emissions reductions. 
In another poll, in the spring of 2001, when asked whether they would be “willing to support 
tough government actions to help reduce global warming even if each of the following 
happened as a result,” the percentages of respondents saying “yes” were as follows: 47%, if 
“your utility bill went up;” 38%, if “unemployment increased;” 54% if “a mild increase in 
inflation” resulted (Harris/Yankelovich poll reported in Time, 2001). 
Similar sentiments have been expressed about gasoline prices, though there seems to have 
been some decline in support for vehicle emission controls over the past decade; such a trend 
could be associated with the increased popularity of relatively fuel-inefficient SUVs. In 1990, 
59% said “yes” they would be “willing to pay an extra 25 [cents] per gallon of gas to reduce 
pollution and global warming;” in 2001, 48% said they would be willing to do so (Time, 
2001).
 These results bracket a similar finding of another question that was not explicitly about 
global warming, but is nevertheless germane – “Should the government require improvements 
in fuel efficiency for cars and trucks even if this means higher prices and smaller vehicles?” – 
to which 55% of the respondents replied “yes” (Harris/Yankelovich poll reported in Time, 
2001). 
5.  Alternative Energy Sources 
A survey in 2001 found that fully three-fourths of those polled “generally favoured” both 
specific regulations as well as government subsidies for alternative energy sources; 75% 
favored “setting higher emissions standards for automobiles” and 79% favoured “spending 
more government money on developing solar and wind power” (Gallup, 2002c). More 
generally, when given a choice of alternatives “to meet America’s energy needs,” 19% 
favored “tax breaks to energy companies and utilities to build more coal-fired and nuclear 
power plants and increase drilling for oil and natural gas,” and 73% wanted to “expand the 
use of renewable energy sources like wind and solar power, strengthen energy efficiency 
standards for air conditioners, and build cars, minivans and SUVs that get better gas mileage” 
(Reuters, 2002; Union of Concerned Scientists, 2002a; 2002b).  
6.  International Technology Transfer and Economic Assistance 
A poll by the University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes in 1995 
found that 90% said “yes” to the question, “If the less-developed countries are willing to limit 
their [greenhouse gas] emissions, do you think the developed countries should provide the 
technology and training necessary to help them make their industries less polluting?” 
(Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2002). In 1998, the same organisation found that 
79% supported “environmental aid to poor countries to help them preserve their environment 
and to reduce pollution, especially pollution that may contribute to global warming;” 38% 
wanted to increase it, and 41% wanted to maintain it at the same level (Program on 
International Policy Attitudes, 2002).  
7.  Comparisons of US Public with US Leaders  
A survey sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall 
Fund of the United States in the summer of 2002 makes it possible to compare US public 
opinion with a sample of 397 US leaders’ opinions (Kennedy and Bouton, 2002).
7 On the 
                                                 
7 The total sample of 397 leaders included: 65 members of congress or their staffs, 34 officials in the 
administration, 38 business executives, 59 in the media, 32 labor leaders, 75 educators, 50  religious leaders, 23   WHERE IS THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE IN PUBLIC OPINION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES? 
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basis of interviews with these leaders, plus interviews with the general public, there appears to 
be a gap between the opinions of the former and the latter. In particular, whereas 48%
8 of the 
public thought that global warming represents a “threat to country’s critical interests over the 
next ten years,” only 28% of the leaders thought so. 
More generally, whereas 66% of the public in 2002 thought that “improving the global 
environment” should be a “very important” goal of foreign policy, only 43% of the leaders 
thought so. A less large but still sizable gap between the public and the leaders was also 
evident in the 1998 survey. However, if the data are interpreted more in relative terms and 
less in absolute terms, the gap does not seem so large (see Table 3). In any case, the question 
of the nature and magnitude of a public-leader gap on these issues is one that ought to receive 
further attention in future surveys. 
Table 3. Importance of improving the global environment as a foreign policy goal 
Question: “I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States 
might have. For each one please say whether you think that it should be a very 
important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign 
policy goal, or not an important goal at all.” 
Respondents who replied “very important” 
2002 
 Percent
a Rank
 b  Avg., all issues
c  Range, all issues
c 
Public 66%  na  na  na 
Leaders  43%  11/20  44%  21% - 89% 
1998 
 Percent
 a  Rank
b  Avg., all issues  Range, all issues
 
Public  43%  8/13  52%  24% - 84% 
Leaders  27%  7/13  34%  16% - 67% 
a Percent of respondents who indicated this was “very important”.  
b Rank of percent indicating “very important” relative to other issues. There were questions about 13 issues in 
1998 and 20 issues in 2002. 
Sources: 1998 data are from CCFR (1999, p. 55); 2002 data are from CCFR/GMF (2002b, ch. 8; 2002d, p. 42). 
 
8.  Comparisons of US and European Publics 
Because the 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund survey was 
undertaken in parallel with surveys in six countries in Europe, it is possible to make several 
cross-national comparative observations on key issues. Taken as a group, a population-
                                                                                                                                                          
special interest group representatives, and 21 staff members of private foreign policy organisations. Because of 
the inherent difficulties of defining the universe of “leaders” and sampling them proportionately in sub-groups, 
precise comparisons with the results of random samples of the adult population are problematic. Additional 
details about the definitions of the sub-populations and the directories used to draw the sub-samples are available 
in CCFR/GMF (2000d, Technical Appendix, following p. 57). 
8 There is a small difference between the 48% reported in this context and the 46% reported elsewhere in the 
reports from the study; the precise figure depends on the sub- sample.  T HOMAS L. BREWER 
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weighted average of 49% of the public in the six European countries thought that global 
warming was “an extremely important threat” (the highest response category); this was 
similar to the 46% of the US public that thought it was a “critical” threat (also the highest 
response category in the US version of the survey).
9 Although only 24% of the Polish 
respondents expressed this view, the publics in the other five European countries expressing 
such a high level of concern varied from 42% to 64% (CCFR/GMF, 2002c, 33). In short, the 
US and European publics appear to have similarly high levels of concern about global 
warming, and greater levels than the concerns of the US leaders. 
Further, the US administration’s handling of global warming received the lowest marks of the 
fourteen issues that were identified in one series of questions in the same surveys: 77% of the 
Europeans gave the US administration “poor” or “fair” ratings (13% said “good” or 
“excellent”). At the same time, 65% of the US respondents rated the administration as “poor” 
or “fair” in its handling of this issue (25% gave it a rating of “good” or “excellent”). As for 
individual European countries, the most negative was Britain, where 86% said the US 
administration was doing only a “poor” or “fair” job (CCFR/GMF, 2002c, 25). See Table 4 
for additional details. 
An earlier multi-country survey – this one in August 2001 – found disapproval rates of the US 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol to be 83% in Britain, 85% in France, 87% in Germany and 
80% in Italy (International Herald Tribune, 2001). 
Table 4a. Opinions of the US administration’s handling of global warming: Comparisons of 
US and European publics 
Question: “How do you rate the George W. Bush administration’s handling of the following 
problems? Would you say the American administration’s handling of … global 
warming … has been excellent, good, fair, or poor”? 
Percentages 
Rating US  Europe
 a 
1. Excellent    6    2 
2. Good  19  11 
Subtotal (1+2)
b 25  13 
3. Fair  32  27 
4. Poor  33  50 
Subtotal (3+4)
b 65  77 
DK/Other 10  10 
a Weighted averages based on populations of six countries (see Table 4b). 
b Subtotals computed by the author. 
Source: CCFR/GMF (2002c, p. 25). 
 
                                                 
9 The figure for Europe is a weighted average (based on the population sizes) of surveys in Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland. There were 1000 interviews in each country (1001 in France) 
conducted by telephone (except face-to-face in Poland) during 5-6 July 2002. The US survey was conducted 
during 1-30 June 2002. There was not a comparable survey of leaders in any of the European countries.   WHERE IS THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE IN PUBLIC OPINION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES? 
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Table 4b. Opinions of the US administration’s handling of global warming: Results for six 
individual European countries 
Percentages 
 UK  Fr.  Ger.  Neth.  Italy  Poland 
Excellent    1    1    1    1    3    4 
Good    6    5  12    7  13  25 
Fair  21 22 30 31 35 21 
Poor  65 63 52 54 39 17 
DK/Other    7    9    5    8  10  33 
Sample sizes: 1000 in each country, except 1001 in France. 
Source: CCFR/GMF (2002c, p. 25). 
 
9.  Conclusions 
About two-fifths of the US public is seriously concerned about global warming; they consider 
it a very serious problem and believe that it is already having an effect. At the opposite end of 
the continuum, there is an unconcerned one-fifth – that is, people who do not consider global 
warming much of problem and do not worry about it very much or not at all; many of them do 
not believe that carbon dioxide emissions are a cause of global warming. Between these two 
groups, there is a moderately concerned group consisting of about two-fifths of the 
population. These are people who think global warming is a problem, but who regard it more 
as a future threat rather than an imminent threat. The future of government policies will 
depend partly on whether, when and how much the opinions of this moderately concerned 
group in the middle shift over time. 
As for possible solutions, there is substantial support for a variety of government actions to 
address global warming issues: 
•  About two-thirds of the public think the US should participate in the Kyoto Protocol. 
•  There is more support for mandatory emissions limits than for voluntary programs. 
•  Approximately half the public say they would approve of government actions to mitigate 
global warming, even if such measures meant higher electricity or gasoline or other prices. 
•  Substantial majorities favor government subsidies for research and development of 
alternative energy sources. 
•  There has been a majority in favor of US international economic assistance to fund 
mitigation projects in developing countries. 
In an international comparative perspective, majorities of the publics in the US and Europe 
share a concern about the problem of global warming. They agree in their support for the 
Kyoto Protocol, and they both disapprove of the US administration’s handling of the problem 
of global warming. The levels of concern, support and disapproval, respectively, on these 
questions tend to be higher in Europe than in the United States. 
On the basis of the survey evidence available to date, US leaders appear to be less concerned 
than the public in the US (or in Europe) about the problem of global warming, and the leaders 
are less supportive of the Kyoto Protocol as a policy alternative for dealing with the problem.  T HOMAS L. BREWER 
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Whether such public/leader gaps also exist on other policy alternatives and whether these and 
other gaps will persist over time can of course only be determined by further research based 
on additional surveys. 
In the future, as climate change issues become increasingly embedded into other issues - such 
as energy R&D policy, auto emissions policy, and international trade and investment policy – 
the questions in surveys should reflect the complexity and pervasiveness of climate change 
issues faced by governments, corporations and NGOs, and thus by the public. There should 
also be more attention given in future surveys to the apparent gap between public concerns 
and preferences and those of leaders. Such expansions of the scope of future surveys could 
advance our understanding of public opinion along several key dimensions. 
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